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Abstract
Traditional statistical methods for confidentiality protection of statistical databases
do not scale well to deal with GWAS (genome-wide association studies) databases espe-
cially in terms of guarantees regarding protection from linkage to external information.
The more recent concept of differential privacy, introduced by the cryptographic com-
munity, is an approach which provides a rigorous definition of privacy with meaningful
privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary external information, although the guar-
antees come at a serious price in terms of data utility. Building on such notions, we
propose new methods to release aggregate GWAS data without compromising an in-
dividual’s privacy. We present methods for releasing differentially private minor allele
frequencies, chi-square statistics and p-values. We compare these approaches on sim-
ulated data and on a GWAS study of canine hair length involving 685 dogs. We also
propose a privacy-preserving method for finding genome-wide associations based on a
differentially-private approach to penalized logistic regression.
Key Words: chi-squared statistics; contingency tables; differential privacy;
genome-wide association studies (GWAS); logistic regression; p-values; single nucleotide
polymorphism (SNP).
1 Introduction
In an article that shocked the genetics community, Homer et al. [12] claimed that, under
certain conditions, they could use statistical methods to “accurately and robustly [resolve]”
the presence of an individual with known genotype in a mix of DNA samples from which only
the minor allele frequencies (MAFs) are known. Their approach compared the MAFs of a
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specific individual to the distribution of MAFs in a reference population and the distribution
of MAFs in a test population and then used a t-test to assess if the individual was part of
the test population.
Although proposed specifically for use in a forensic context and only secondarily for
breaking privacy, the Homer et al. [12] “attack” appeared to be generally applicable. As
a reference population one might use the publicly available single nucleotide polymorphism
(SNP) data from the HapMap project1 which consists of SNP data from 4 populations
varying in size from 45 to 90 individuals. Note that the HapMap data set does not contain
any information regarding the health status of the individuals. For the test population
one might use the cases in genome-wide association studies (GWAS), which contain both
genotype data and disease status. Before the appearance of the article [12], the averaged
MAFs of the cases and the averaged MAFs of the controls in a GWAS were typically publicly
available.
In response to Homer et al. [12], Braun et al. [3] showed that their proposed test depends
heavily on the assumption that the genotypes of the test population, the reference population
and the specific person under consideration are samples from the same underlying popula-
tion and that the SNPs used in the study are independent (i.e., that there is no linkage
disequilibrium present). These assumptions are usually not met in practice, and as a conse-
quence, the Homer et al. attack lead to a high false-positive rate, see e.g. Braun et al. [3].
Others have criticized Homer et al., suggested alternative formulations of the identification
problem, claimed to strengthen the attack or suggested different ways to protect the data,
e.g., see [6, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 26]. Despite the apparent limitations of the Homer
et al. attack on the privacy of GWAS participants and the controversial and, we believe,
exaggerated nature of their statistical claims, NIH immediately removed from open-access
databases all aggregate results such as values of averaged MAFs over cases and controls,
chi-square (χ2)-statistics and p-values (see Couzin [7] and Zerhouni and Nabel [25]). The
NIH policy remains in effect today. Every researcher, who wants to gain access to any of
these data sets, needs to go through an elaborate approval process. This is a particularly
difficult obstacle for computer scientists, mathematicians or statisticians who do not have a
credible record in GWAS research.
Here we propose methods which allow for the release of aggregate GWAS data without
compromising an individual’s privacy, and in many ways totally bystep the debate on the
validity of the claims by Homer et al. [12] and others on the vulnerability of GWAS databases.
Our GWAS privacy guarantees utilize the concept of differential privacy, recently introduced
by the cryptographic community (e.g., Dwork et al. [9]). Differential privacy provides a
rigorous definition of privacy with meaningful privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary
external information. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a method for the release of the averaged MAFs for the cases and for the
controls in GWAS without compromising an individual’s privacy.
1http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
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• We compute -differentially private χ2-statistics and p-values and provide a differen-
tially private algorithm for releasing these statistics for the most relevant SNPs.
• Conditions such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes are caused by the interaction of
various genes and possibly the environment. Detecting such interaction among SNPs
related to a specific phenotype (i.e., epistasis) is a main goal of GWAS. Most methods
for finding epistasis are based on a two-stage approach: (1) Filtering all SNPs, e.g.,
using χ2-statistics or a simple logistic regression, to reduce the potentially interacting
SNPs to a small number; (2) Further examining the loci achieving some threshold
for interactions. For example, Park and Hastie [19] use a form of penalized logistic
regression to test for detecting gene-gene interactions on a small number of SNPs. By
adapting the work of [1] and [5] to this methodology, we derive a privacy-preserving
method for GWAS, where both stages in the two-stage approach satisfy -differential
privacy.
Section 2 describes the basic problem and relevant definitions. In Section 3, we present
methods for releasing -differentially private MAFs, χ2-statistics and p-values, and in Section
4 we evaluate their statistical utility on data based on a simulation study and on a GWAS
study of canine hair length involving 685 dogs. In Section 5, we propose a differentially-
private method for finding genome-wide associations based on a penalized approach to logistic
regression.
2 Main Definitions and Notation
In a typical GWAS setting, we study the interaction between various SNPs and a binary
phenotype, as for example the disease status of an individual. The binary phenotype takes
values 0 (e.g., non-diseased) and 1 (e.g., diseased). We denote the total number of individuals
in a GWAS by N and assume throughout the paper that the number of cases and controls
is equal, i.e., there are N/2 cases and N/2 controls. This corresponds to the usual setting
in GWAS and is necessary in order to achieve sufficient power to detect SNPs which are
associated with a disease. We denote the total number of SNPs in a GWAS by M ′ and
the number of SNPs for which we would like to release aggregate data by M . We assume
that the SNPs are polymorphic with only two possible nucleotides. The SNPs therefore take
values 0, 1, and 2 representing the number of minor alleles. We summarize the data for each
SNP in a 3 × 2 contingency table, where the count in cell (i, j) consists of the number of
individuals with genotype i and disease status j. We also assume throughout the paper that
all margins of such a 3× 2 contingency table are positive. This is motivated by the fact that
in GWAS usually all SNPs with a MAF smaller than 0.05 are removed from the study.
Definition 2.1. A randomized mechanism K is -differentially private if, for all data sets
D and D′ which differ in at most one individual and for any t ∈ R,
Pr(K(D) = t)
Pr(K(D′) = t) ≤ e
.
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Definition 2.2. The sensitivity of a function f : DN → Rd, where DN denotes the set of all
databases with N individuals, is the smallest number S(f) such that
||f(D)− f(D′)||1 ≤ S(f),
for all data sets D,D′ ∈ DN differing in a single individual.
Releasing f(D) + b, where b is random noise drawn from a Laplace distribution with
mean 0 and scale S(f)

satisfies the definition of -differential privacy (e.g., see [9]). This type
of release mechanism is often referred to as the Laplace mechanism.
Definition 2.3. The KL divergence between two probability distributions f and g is defined
by
DKL(f ||g) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x) log
f(x)
g(x)
dx. (1)
For the analysis of the simulation results in Section 3 we use the KL divergence to
measure the difference between two distributions such as the original χ2-statistic and its
corresponding -differentially private version.
3 Privacy-Preserving Methodology
In this section we compute the sensitivity of MAFs, χ2-statistics and p-values needed to
release the private versions of these statistics for each SNP via the Laplace mechanism. We
also describe an -differentially private algorithm for the release of the latter two quantities
for the M most relevant SNPs.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Release of Aggregate MAFs
We now describe a method for releasing the averaged MAFs for the cases and for the controls
in GWAS which satisfies differential privacy. The true data form a table consisting of the
MAFs of the cases and the controls for M SNPs; e.g., see Table 1. In the following, we
compute the amount of Laplace noise we need to add to such a table in order to satisfy
-differential privacy.
Lemma 3.1. The sensitivity of the averaged MAFs of the cases and the controls based on
N individuals, with N/2 cases and N/2 controls, for M SNPs is 2M
N
.
Table 1: Table showing the averaged MAFs of the cases and the controls for M SNPs.
MAF SNP 1 SNP 2 · · · SNP M
Cases 0.29 0.20 · · · 0.11
Controls 0.27 0.31 · · · 0.10
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the individual, whose genotype we can
change, belongs to the cases. Denote this individual by j. For a given SNP we denote the
number of minor alleles of individual i before adding noise by ai and the perturbed counts
by a′i. Note that ai = a
′
i for all i 6= j. In addition, |aj − a′j| ≤ 2. Therefore, for a given SNP
we can compute the sensitivity of the averaged MAF as follows:∣∣∣∣∣ 1N/2
N/2∑
i=1
ai
2
− 1
N/2
N/2∑
i=1
a′i
2
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1N/2
∣∣∣∣∣aj2 − a′j2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2N .
This holds for every SNP. As a consequence, for M SNPs the sensitivity is 2M
N
, namely the
1-norm of the M -dimensional vector where all entries are 2
N
.
Lemma 3.1 shows that a data release mechanism that adds Laplace noise with mean 0
and scale 2M
N
to each cell entry in Table 1 yields -differential privacy. This result can be
seen as a special case of Example 3 in [9] where every cell entry is a histogram by itself.
Similarly, if instead of releasing the averaged MAFs, we want to release M 3 × 2 tables
containing the counts for each genotype and disease status, the sensitivity would be 2M .
Therefore, we have to add Laplace noise with mean 0 and scale 2M

to ensure -differential
privacy.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Release of χ2-Statistics and p-Values
In many GWAS settings, researchers report the χ2-statistics and the p-values of the most
relevant SNPs. We propose a method for releasing these quantities in a differential privacy-
preserving way, by first computing the sensitivity and then modifying a method proposed in
[1], for release of frequent itemsets, to release the noisy statistics corresponding to the most
relevant SNPs.
Theorem 3.2. The sensitivity of the χ2-statistic based on a 3 × 2 contingency table with
positive margins and N/2 cases and N/2 controls is 4N
N+2
.
Proof. Consider the following 3× 2 contingency table with positive margins and N/2 cases
and controls each:
Disease Status
0 1
No. Individuals 0 a m-a
With Genotype 1 b n-b
2 N/2-a-b N/2-m-n+a+b
Total N/2 N/2
with a, b ≥ 0, m,n > 0, a ≤ m, b ≤ n, a+ b ≤ N/2, and m+ n < N . Let
D = {(a, b,m, n) ∈ N | m > 0, n > 0, a ≤ m, b ≤ n,
a+ b ≤ N/2, m+ n < N}.
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Then we can view the χ2-statistic as a function
χ2 : D −→ R≥0,
where (a, b,m, n) gets mapped to the χ2-statistic of the corresponding contingency table.
The sensitivity corresponds to the values of (a, b,m, n) ∈ D ∩ {a ≥ 1}, which maximize
|χ2(a, b,m, n)− χ2(a− 1, b+ 1,m− 1, n+ 1)|.
Our approach is to compute the sensitivity by maximizing the directional derivative of
χ2(a, b,m, n) in direction (−1/2, 1/2,−1/2, 1/2). First note that
χ2(a, b,m, n) =
(2a−m)2
m
+
(2b− n)2
n
+
(2a−m+ 2b− n)2
N −m− n .
We then compute the directional derivative of χ2(a, b,m, n) in direction (−1/2, 1/2,−1/2, 1/2).
It is given by
2a2
m2
− 4a
m
− 2b
2
n2
+
4b
n
.
Over D ∩ {a ≥ 1} this is maximized by the smallest possible value of a, the largest possible
value of m, the largest possible value of b and the smallest possible value of n. Consequently,
the sensitivity is given by:∣∣∣∣∣χ2
 1 N/2N/2− 2 0
1 0
− χ2
 0 N/2N/2− 1 0
1 0
∣∣∣∣∣,
which we can easily see to be 4N
N+2
.
Note that the sensitivity of the χ2-statistic grows as a function of N , but is asymptotically
constant. This is interesting since the χ2-statistic for a table with fixed frequencies grows
proportional to N . In order to achieve -differential privacy for releasing the χ2-statistic for
a single SNP, we need to add Laplace noise with scale 1

4N
N+2
to the true χ2-statistic. Thus
for increasing N , the perturbed (private) χ2-statistics get more accurate.
Before we consider the sensitivity of the p-values, we derive the asymptotic distribution
of the perturbed χ2-statistic which is a convolution of its (asymptotic) sampling distribution
and perturbation.
Theorem 3.3. Let a χ2 test statistic T have the χ2 sampling distribution with 2 degrees of
freedom and let the perturbation Y ∼ Laplace(0, 4/). Then, the distribution of the perturbed
χ2 test statistic, X = T + Y , has the following probability density function
f(x) =


4
1
+2
exp
(
x
4
)
if x < 0

4
[(
1
−2 +
1
+2
)
exp
(−x
2
)− 1
−2 exp
(− x
4
)]
if x ≥ 0
,
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and the following cumulative distribution function
F (x) =

1
+2
exp
(
x
4
)
if x < 0
1− 
2
(
1
−2 +
1
+2
)
exp
(−x
2
)
+ 1
−2 exp
(− x
4
)
if x ≥ 0
.
Proof. Since T and Y are independent random variables, the distribution of X is the con-
volution of the given χ2 and Laplace distributions.
We show through simulations in Section 4 that the finite sample distribution is well-
approximated by this asymptotic distribution even for tables with low total count, marginal
counts or individual counts. This is in contrast to the poor finite sample behavior of the
χ2 test statistics arising when the noise is added directly to the underlying cell counts (see
Section 4); the latter mechanism has been considered by many (e.g., [9, 10]). For related
simulations that demonstrate the interactive effect of sample size and privacy level  and
compare asymptotic efficiency of private and non-private estimators for 2× 2 tables and the
corresponding χ2-statistics, see [23].
We now prove that the asymptotic distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic arising from
perturbing the cell counts is the same as for the unperturbed χ2-statistic, namely a χ2-
distribution with two degrees of freedom.
Theorem 3.4. Let X(n) denote a 6-dimensional random variable corresponding to the entries
of a 3 × 2 contingency table based on n individuals. Let Y denote a 6-dimensional random
variable drawn from Laplace(0, 2

). Then the perturbed χ2-statistic arising from perturbed cell
counts (X(n) + Y ) asymptotically has a χ2-distribution with two degrees of freedom.
Proof. Let p0, p1, p2, q0, q1 ∈ [0, 1] such that p0 + p1 + p2 = 1 and q0 + q1 = 1. Under the
null hypothesis of independence on a 3 × 2 contingency table the data is sampled from a
multinomial distribution with probability vector pˆ = (p0q0, p0q1, p1q0, p1q1, p2q0, p2q1)
T . The
central limit theorem implies that
√
n
(
X(n)
n
− pˆ
)
d−→ N (0,Σ) ,
where Σ is the covariance matrix of the product multinomial, i.e.
Σ = Γ− pˆpˆT
and Γ = diag(pˆ). Note that Σ has rank 2 and therefore also Γ−
1
2ΣΓ−
1
2 . Let Y ∼ Laplace(0, 2

).
Slutsky’s theorem implies that
√
n
(
X(n) + Y
n
− pˆ
)
d−→ N (0,Σ) ,
and therefore that
√
n Γ−
1
2
(
X(n) + Y
n
− pˆ
)
d−→ N
(
0,Γ−
1
2ΣΓ−
1
2
)
.
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Finally, by invoking the continuous mapping theorem, we prove the claim, namely
χ2perturbed = n
(
X(n) + Y
n
− pˆ
)T
Γ−1
(
X(n) + Y
n
− pˆ
)
d−→ χ22.
Given the above derived distributions, the researcher can now compute the p-values for
the test of independence using the perturbed χ2-statistics (when perturbing the test statistic
itself or when adding noise at the level of the cell counts).
We also consider releasing differentially private p-values (without perturbing the counts
or the related statistic first). We perform a similar sensitivity analysis on the p-values
corresponding to the χ2-statistics when assuming a χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom
as null distribution, cf. [2].
Theorem 3.5. The sensitivity of the p-values of the χ2-statistic for a 3 × 2 contingency
table with positive margins and N/2 cases and N/2 controls is exp(−2/3), when the null
distribution is a χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
Proof. Under the null χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, the p-value corresponding
to a value x of the χ2-statistic is
exp(−x
2
), x ≥ 0.
The first derivative in absolute value is maximized by x = 0. Therefore, the sensitivity of
the p-value is given by a change of 1 unit in a contingency table with χ2 = 0, i.e., in a
contingency table of the form  a ab b
N/2− a− b N/2− a− b
 ,
where a, b > 0, and a+ b < N/2. We therefore need to find a, b which maximize∣∣∣∣∣p-value
 a ab b
N/2− a− b N/2− a− b
−
p-value
 a− 1 ab+ 1 b
N/2− a− b N/2− a− b
∣∣∣∣∣,
where a, b > 0, and a+ b < N/2. Equivalently, we need to maximize
χ2
 a− 1 ab+ 1 b
N/2− a− b N/2− a− b

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over a, b > 0, and a+ b < N/2. The corresponding χ2-statistic is given by
1
2a− 1 +
1
2b+ 1
,
which is maximized by a = b = 1 and results in a χ2-statistic of 4/3. Consequently, the
sensitivity of the p-value is exp(−2/3).
The -differentially private mechanism for a single SNP would then release a private
p-value equal to the original value plus Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 1

exp(−2/3).
The sensitivity of the χ2-statistic corresponds to the most ‘dependent’ contingency table
while the sensitivity of the p-value is determined by an ‘independent’ contingency table. By
the most ‘dependent’ (resp. ‘independent’) contingency table we mean a table which achieves
the maximal (resp. minimal) χ2-statistic over all contingency tables with N individuals. The
maximal χ2-statistic is N , while the minimal χ2-statistic is 0.
Since in practice we are not interested in contingency tables with very large p-values, we
in effect have overestimated the sensitivity of the p-value, and wish instead to determine the
sensitivity of the p-value within the range of “interesting” contingency tables. We therefore
analyze what happens if we project all p-values, which are larger than a given value p∗, onto
p∗. Since the χ2-statistic for a table with fixed marginal frequencies grows in proportion to
N , we analyze the situation where p∗ decreases with increasing N , i.e., p∗ = exp(−N/c),
where c is some constant to be specified by the user. Such a p-value corresponds to a table
with χ2-statistic 2N/c and can be viewed as a contingency table which is at least N/c steps
of Hamming distance 1 away from independence.
Corollary 3.6. Projecting all p-values which are larger than p∗ = exp(−N/c) onto p∗ results
in a sensitivity of
exp
(
−N
c
)
− exp
(
−N(2Nc− 4N − 4c+ c
2)
2c(Nc− 2N − c)
)
for any fixed constant c ≥ 3, which is a factor of N/2.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.5. We here give an
overview. The contingency table  0 NcN
c
0
N(c−2)
2c
N(c−2)
2c

has a χ2-statistic 2N
c
and hence a p-value of exp(−N/c). This table has the maximal χ2-
statistic over all tables which are N/c steps of Hamming distance 1 away from independence,
i.e., this table is N/c steps away from the following table N2c N2cN
2c
N
2c
N(c−2)
2c
N(c−2)
2c
 .
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The largest change in χ2-statistic is achieved by moving one individual from cell (3, 2) to cell
(1, 2) resulting in the table  0 N+ccN
c
0
N(c−2)
2c
N(c−2)−2c
2c
 .
This new contingency table has χ2-statistic
N(2Nc− 4N − 4c+ c2)
c(Nc− 2N − c) .
For large N ,
N(2Nc− 4N − 4c+ c2)
c(Nc− 2N − c) ≈
2N
c
,
and the corresponding p-value is of the order of p∗.
In GWAS settings, however, researchers typically provide only the χ2-statistics or the
corresponding p-values of the M most significant SNPs. Since the ranking reveals additional
information, it is not sufficient to add the above computed noise to these statistics in order
to achieve differential privacy. Bhaskar et al. [1] show in the context of frequent pattern
recognition how to release the most significant patterns together with their frequencies while
satisfying differential privacy. We adapt their method by incorporating our results from
Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.5 to GWAS, and state the main result of this section: Algorithm
1 for releasing the private χ2-statistics (p-values) of the M most relevant SNPs.
Let M ′ denote the total number of SNPs in a GWAS and M the number of statistics
one would like to release. Naively, one might expect that it is necessary to add Laplace
noise with scale M
′

4N
N+2
for the χ2-statistics and M
′

exp(−2/3) for the p-values. As we see
in Algorithm 1, however, the Laplace noise only scales with the number of actually released
statistics M .
Theorem 3.7. Algorithm 1 is -differentially private.
Proof. Using the sensitivities computed in Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.5, the proof follows
immediately from Theorem 5 in [1].
4 Evaluation of Methodology and Results
We now evaluate the performance of the proposed methods based on data from a simulation
study and using a GWAS data set consisting of 685 dogs and their hair length. The GWAS
data for the hair length of dogs has first been presented and studied in [4] and further been
analyzed in [16]. It consists of 685 dogs, 319 dogs with long hair as cases and 364 with
short hair as controls, and contains 40, 842 SNPs. Cadieu et al. [4] have shown that the long
10
Algorithm 1 -Differentially Private Algorithm for Releasing the M Most Relevant SNPs
Input: The χ2-statistics (resp. p-values) for all M ′ SNPs and the number of statistics,
M , we want to release.
Output: The M noisy χ2-statistics (resp. p-values).
1. Add Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 4M

4N
N+2
to the χ2-statistics (resp. Laplace
noise with mean zero and scale 4M

exp(−2/3) to the p-values).
2. Pick the top M SNPs with respect to the perturbed χ2-statistics (resp. p-values).
We denote the corresponding set of SNPs by S.
3. Add new Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 2M

4N
N+2
to the true χ2-statistics of
the SNPs in S (resp. Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 2M

exp(−2/3) to the
true p-values) and release these perturbed statistics.
versus short hair phenotype is associated with a mutation in the fibroblast growth factor-5
(FGF5 gene) and the largest χ2-statistic is achieved by a SNP located on chromosome 32 at
position 7, 100, 913, i.e., about 300Kb apart from FGF5.
We also use the simulations from [16] performed using HAP-SAMPLE [24]. HAP-
SAMPLE generates the cases and controls by resampling from HapMap. The simulated
data show linkage disequilibrium and allele frequencies similar to real data. The simulated
association studies consist of 400 cases and 400 controls with about 10,000 SNPs per individ-
ual (SNPs typed with the Affy CHIP on chromosome 9 and chromosome 13 of the Phase I/II
HapMap data). Two SNPs were chosen to be causative and the simulations were performed
for three different MAFs (0.1, 0.25 and 0.4) and two different models of interaction (additive
effect and multiplicative effect of the two SNPs). See [16] for more details.
For this paper, we omit the simulation results on the statistical utility of -differentially
private release of aggregate MAFs. Our results are similar to those reported in the current
literature on Laplace mechanism for noise addition to histograms or smaller contingency
tables with proportions (e.g., [9], [23]). Instead, we focus on the release of differentially-
private χ2-statistics, p-values and the most relevant SNPs.
4.1 Asymptotic distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic
We first present results on the asymptotic distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic arising
from adding noise directly to the statistic, as derived in Theorem 3.3, and evaluate the
accuracy of the asymptotic approximation. The distribution for  = 0.2 is described in
Figure 1, and a comparison of three distributions, namely the asymptotic χ2-distribution,
the asymptotic Laplace distribution and their convolution for different values of the privacy
parameter  are shown in Figure 2; we can observe that the asymptotic distribution of the
perturbed χ2-statistic is very similar to the underlying Laplace distribution as expected
based on the convolution derived in Theorem 3.3.
11
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Figure 1: Asymptotic distribution of the perturbed χ2 test statistic for  = 0.2: density
function (left), cumulative distribution function (middle), and quantile function (right).
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Figure 2: Comparison of the asymptotic sampling distribution (black line), perturbation
(black dotted line) and its convolution (red line) for  = 0.1 (left),  = 0.2 (middle left),
 = 0.3 (middle right), and  = 0.4 (right).
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Through simulations we analyzed at which point the asymptotic approximation seems to
be accurate for finite samples. It turns out that even for tables with very small cell counts or
marginal counts, the finite sample distribution of the private χ2-statistic is well-approximated
by its asymptotic distribution, although it is well known that the exact distribution of the
original χ2-statistic is very poorly approximated by the χ2-distribution for small samples.
As an example we discuss the following table: 1 38 12
41 35
 .
We ran a Markov chain on the set of contingency tables which have the same margins as
the above table using tools from Algebraic Statistics, namely elements of a Markov basis as
moves (e.g., see [8]). At each step (table), we computed the corresponding χ2-statistic and
added Laplace noise with scale 4

. The resulting posterior distribution is an approximation
to the true distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic and corresponds to the black dotted line
in Figure 3. The asymptotic distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic derived in Theorem
3.3 is shown in red. These plots and additional simulations show that the asymptotic ap-
proximation is accurate even for tables with a low total count, marginal counts or individual
cell counts.
Similarly, we now analyze under which conditions the asymptotic distribution of the
perturbed χ2-statistic arising from perturbing the cell counts, as shown in Theorem 3.4,
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Figure 3: Asymptotic distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic (red line) and its true distri-
bution (black dotted line).
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appears to be accurate for finite samples. As we will see, when adding noise to the cell
counts instead of the χ2-statistic, the asymptotic distribution of the computed statistic is
only accurate for a very large total cell count. We analyze the following tables, one with a
total cell count of 10,000 and two with a total cell count of 100,000:
(1)
1400 16001900 1300
1700 2100
 , (2)
14000 1600019000 13000
17000 21000
 , (3)
 1 326000 21000
23999 28997
 .
We again ran a Markov chain on the set of contingency tables which have the same
margins as the above tables using a Markov basis to move between tables. At each step we
perturbed the counts by adding Laplace noise with scale 2

and computed the corresponding
perturbed χ2-statistic. The resulting posterior distribution is an approximation to the true
distribution of the perturbed χ2-statistic and is shown in Figure 4 for four values of the
privacy parameter . Also the true distribution of the unperturbed χ2-statistic and the χ2-
distribution are shown for comparison. Note that a total cell count of 10, 000 is not sufficient
for a good approximation of the finite sample distribution by the asymptotic distribution.
For a total cell count of 100, 000 the approximation appears to be accurate as long as the
individual cell counts and margins are not too small, as in the case of the third table.
4.2 Differentially-Private χ2-Statistics
Based on the results from the previous section, releasing differentially private χ2-statistics
versus perturbing cell counts and then computing the perturbed statistics, seems to work
better on finite (and smaller) samples. Next, we focus on evaluating the statistical utility
of the proposed release mechanism following Theorem 3.2. We compare the -differentially
private χ2-statistic to the original statistic via KL divergence. We generated 3×2 contingency
tables with positive margins andN/2 cases andN/2 controls assuming a product-multinomial
distribution with the following frequencies:
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Figure 4: Exact and asymptotic distribution of the perturbed and unperturbed χ2-statistic.
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(a)
0.72 0.200.18 0.28
0.10 0.52
 , (b)
0.60 0.230.21 0.30
0.19 0.47
 ,
(c)
0.47 0.250.45 0.51
0.08 0.24
 , (d)
0.65 0.460.29 0.43
0.06 0.11
 .
(2)
For the χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, an observed value of 6 corresponds to a
p-value of exp(−3) ≈ 0.05. The preceding frequency tables correspond to contingency tables
for which we expect a p-value of 0.05 for
(a)N = 20, (b)N = 40, (c)N = 80, (d)N = 160.
For example, for N = 200 individuals and underlying frequency table (a) we expect a table
of the form 72 2018 28
10 52
 ,
which has a χ2-statistic of 60. Therefore, for N = 20 we expect a χ2-statistic of 6. If we fix
the number of individuals N , then the χ2-statistic corresponding to frequency table (a) is
the largest, namely 8 times the χ2-statistic corresponding to frequency table (d).
The choice of the frequency tables in (2) is motivated by the GWAS on the hair length
of dogs in [4] and our simulations using HAP-SAMPLE. The χ2-statistic resulting from the
frequency table (a) is comparable to the χ2-statistic of the SNP most associated to the
hair length in dogs (on chromosome 32 at position 7, 100, 913 in the CanMap data set).
The χ2-statistic resulting from the frequency table (c) is comparable to the χ2-statistic of a
causative SNP in a simulated association study under the additive model (i.e., main effects
only model) for MAF = 0.4, and (d) is comparable to a causative SNP under the additive
model for MAF = 0.25. The frequency table (b) corresponds to an intermediate model for
a causative SNP with high MAF and was added for consistency.
For a fixed total number of individuals N , we generated 10,000 tables from the frequency
tables in (2) and computed the corresponding χ2-statistics. We also generated 10,000 pri-
vate χ2-statistics according to the Laplace mechanism described following Theorem 3.2. In
Figure 5 we plotted the KL divergence between the original and the private χ2-statistics
for increasing N and for four different levels of privacy. The four plots correspond to the
four frequency tables in (2). We see that the KL divergence depends on the χ2-statistic of
the underlying frequency table, the total number of individuals N , and the privacy level .
Since the added noise is asymptotically Laplace(0, 4) distributed, the larger the original χ2-
statistic, the smaller the KL divergence is. Similarly, a larger number of individuals N leads
to a larger χ2-statistic and hence to a smaller KL divergence. The scale of the Laplace noise
is inverse proportional to the privacy parameter . Therefore, the smaller , the larger the
KL divergence is. These simulations demonstrate that it is possible to release -differentially
private χ2-statistics and maintain good statistical utility in a realistic GWAS setting.
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Figure 5: KL divergence between the original χ2-statistic and the private χ2-statistic based
on the frequency table (a) left, (b) middle left, (c) middle right, and (d) right.
4.3 Differentially-Private p-Values
We did a similar analysis on the p-values following the proposed release mechanism of adding
Laplace noise according to Theorem 3.5. Based on the frequency tables in (2), we computed
the KL divergence between the original and private p-values for increasing N and for four
different privacy levels. The resulting plots are shown in Figure 6. Similarly to the χ2-
statistics, the smaller , the larger the KL divergence is. However, the relation between
the KL divergence and the number of individuals, resp. the original χ2-statistic, is reversed
since, for the χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, the χ2-statistic is proportional to
the logarithm of the p-value. The larger the χ2-statistic, the smaller the p-value and hence
the smaller the signal to noise ratio. The jumps in the figures arise because we project the
perturbed p-values which fall outside the interval [0, 1] to 0 or 1, respectively. Although there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the χ2-statistics and the p-values, the χ2-statistics
have a much smaller KL divergence and are therefore better suited for privacy purposes.
Projecting the p-values onto a region of interest as described in Corollary 3.6 results in
plots similar to those in Figure 6; the plots depend on how much smaller the p-value under
consideration is compared to 1 in the case of Theorem 3.5 and p∗ in the case of Corollary
3.6.
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Figure 6: KL divergence between the original p-values and the private p-values based on the
frequency table (a) left, (b) middle left, (c) middle right, and (d) right.
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Figure 7: ROC curves for the perturbed p-values.
Our analysis and the plots in Figure 6 strongly suggest that perturbing the p-values
to achieve -differential privacy leads to too much noise. Making inference based on such
perturbed p-values seems impossible. However, it is a valid question to ask whether there
might exist a cut-off which could control the Type I & Type II errors.
We analyze this question by sampling 500 true positives (p-values in [0, 0.05]) and 500 true
negatives (p-values in [0.05, 1]) uniformly and adding Laplace noise with scale exp(−2
3
)/.
We represent the simulated data in an ROC plot, where we report for all possible cut-off
values the resulting Type I and Type II errors. These plots for four levels of privacy, namely
 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 are shown in Figure 7. We especially indicate the point corresponding
to the usual cut-off of 0.05.
Figure 7 confirms that using the perturbed p-values as a test for independence is not
much better than a random test, independent of the chosen cut-off. Choosing a cut-off of
0.05 seems reasonable, but it is anyways impossible to control the Type I & Type II errors.
An interesting feature in the plots are the long straight lines going from both corners along
the diagonal. These lines arise since we project the perturbed p-values which fall outside
the interval [0, 1] to either 0 or 1. These plots show again that the perturbed p-values are
dominated by these projected 0’s and 1’s rendering a test based on the perturbed p-values
uninformative.
4.4 Releasing the M Most Relevant SNPs with Respect to a Spe-
cific Phenotype
Practitioners are often interested in finding and releasing the most relevant (i.e., most sta-
tistically and practically significant) SNPs. Here we analyze what sample size N is needed
in order to recover the two causative SNPs in the HAP-SAMPLE simulations from the pri-
vate χ2-statistics. We chose M = 3 and plotted the frequencies (based on 1,000 private
χ2-statistics) for which one or both of the two causative SNPs were among the three highest
ranked private χ2-statistics computed according to Algorithm 1. We performed this analysis
for increasing sample size N and for four different privacy levels. We used the simulated
HAP-SAMPLE data consisting of around 10,000 SNPs total with two causative SNPs under
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the additive model with MAF=0.25 and MAF=0.4. The resulting bar charts are shown in
Figure 8.
As we expect, a larger value of  (i.e., less noise/less privacy) results in a higher chance
of releasing the truly causative SNPs. We also observe that the smaller the MAF, the more
data we need to detect the causative SNPs at a fixed level of . For example, for  = 0.4,
Figure 8 shows that for MAF=0.4 we need about 7,500 individuals to detect the causative
SNPs whereas for MAF=0.25 we need about 10,000 individuals. A smaller MAF corresponds
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Figure 8: Bar charts representing the frequencies for which one or both of the two causative
SNPs were among the three highest ranked private χ2-statistics under the additive model
with MAF=0.25 (top) and MAF=0.4 (bottom).
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to a sparser table, and we are in a similar situation to that described in [10], where it is
shown that for sparse tables differential privacy requires adding a lot of noise, often with
the result of impairing statistical inference. Our results support the traditional trade-off: in
order to detect important effects, we need to either relax the privacy constraint or increase
the total number of individuals massively.
An alternative to adding noise to the data we want to release is to add noise to the
analysis itself. We explain this approach for GWAS in the following section.
5 Extended Work: Differentially-Private Algorithm for
Detecting Epistasis
As we just saw, the sparseness of GWAS data requires an unrealistically large number of
individuals in each study or a relaxation of the privacy level. In order to deal with sparseness,
methods have been proposed, where the Laplace noise is added to the analysis directly instead
of to the output. Another advantage of such an approach is that it allows the analysis of
models that integrate information across SNPs. Here we present an -differentially logistic
regression approach that is directly applicable to GWAS.
Most methods for detecting epistasis are based on a two-stage approach. First, all SNPs
are filtered e.g. using χ2-statistics or p-values, to reduce the potential interacting SNPs to a
small number. The loci achieving some threshold are then further examined for interactions.
A widely used test for detecting gene-gene interactions on a small number of SNPs is a
penalized logistic regression, e.g. the L2-regularized logistic regression proposed by Park
and Hastie [19]. By adapting the work of Bhaskar et al. [1] and Chaudhuri et al. [5], we
derive a privacy-preserving method for detecting epistasis, where both stages in the two-stage
approach satisfy differential privacy.
We use the first two steps in Algorithm 1 to chose a subset of interesting SNPs of size M in
a differentially private way. Park and Hastie [19] suggest an L2-regularized logistic regression
in order to detect epistasis within a small subset of SNPs. Chaudhuri et al. [5] demonstrated
how to perturb the objective function for privacy-preserving machine-learning algorithm
designs if the loss function and the regularizer satisfy certain convexity and differentiability
criteria. In the following, we outline how to apply their objective perturbation in order to
find a differentially private algorithm for detecting epistasis.
Let y = (y1, . . . , yN) denote the disease status of the N individuals. Note that in this
section we encode the diseased status by 1 and the non-diseased status by -1. Let xi ∈ Rp+1
denote the feature vector for the ith individual. The first entry corresponds to the intercept.
The encoding of the features is explained via an example. We will look at a model with two
SNPs including their interaction. SNP1 takes the three states 0, 1, and 2, which are encoded
by 100, 010, and 001. Similarly for SNP2. The interaction term SNP1×SNP2 takes the states
00, 01, 02, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22 and is encoded by 100000000, 010000000, . . . , 000000001. So
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an individual with genotype 12, who is not diseased would have
x = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0), y = −1.
Let K − 1 be the total number of effects in the model (including main and higher-order
effects). It is important to note that ||xi||2 ≤ K.
The objective function described in Park and Hastie [19] is
L(β) =
N∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiβTxi)) + 1
2
βTΛβ,
where Λ is of the form (0, λ, . . . , λ), i.e. β0 is not penalized. They use the Newton-Raphson
method for the optimization and forward selection and backward deletion steps based on an
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) score to select
model size and important factors.
We can apply the approach of Chaudhuri et al. [5] to perturb the objective function
such that the algorithm satisfies -differential privacy. We are interested in the following
perturbed objective function:
Lpriv(β) =
N∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiβTxi)) + 1
2
βTΛβ +
1
N
bTβ,
where b is noise drawn from a distribution with density
f(b) =
1
α
exp(−k||b||2)
and k is a constant and α the normalizing constant.
Following the proposal by Park and Hastie [19] we make use of forward selection and
backward deletion steps based on an AIC or BIC score to select model size; however, we
replace the optimization step in their method by Algorithm 2.
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 2 is -differentially private.
Algorithm 2 -Differentially Private Algorithm for Detecting Epistasis
Input: The data vectors xi, yi, where i = 1, . . . , N and parameters , λ, and c.
Output: The output consists of the noisy effects.
1. Let ′ =  − log(1 + 2cK
Nλ
+ c
2K2
N2λ2
). If ′ > 0, then δ = 0, else δ = cK
N(e/4−1) − λ and
′ = /2K.
2. Draw b from a distribution with density f(b) = 1
α
exp(− ||b||2
2
).
3. Compute βpriv = argmin(Lpriv(β) +
1
2
δ||β||2).
20
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 9 in [5], and by taking into account the fact that
||xi||2 ≤ K for our application.
This result allows us to move away from a SNP-by-SNP analysis to an integrated approach
without relaxing privacy. Applying this method to actual GWAS data is part of ongoing
work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that it is possible, using the formal privacy guarantees
of differential privacy, for NIH and other GWAS data repositories as well as “GWAS data
owners” to release at least some genetic data required by practitioners. More specifically, we
described a privacy-preserving release of aggregate minor allele frequencies and the release
of differentially-private χ2-statistics and p-values. We also provided a differentially private
algorithm for releasing these statistics for the most relevant SNPs.
Our simulations, however, indicate that for bigger and sparse data the release of simple
summary statistics is problematic and not sufficient from both privacy and utility perspec-
tives. The release of summary statistics may be at least in part sufficient for traditional
piecewise SNP-by-SNP analysis. More specifically, our results on finite sample properties of
differentially-private χ2-statistics show that adding noise directly to the χ2-statistic achieves
the best trade-off between privacy and utility in comparison to adding noise to the p-values
or cell entries themselves, in particular for tables with small to moderate counts and overall
samples size. However, we require more complex methodology to deal with more sparse
data and models that integrate across SNPs to detect epistasis. To address this problem, we
outlined an -differentially private algorithm for a specific form of penalized logistic regres-
sion. This is but one of the newer methods being introduced into the statistical literature
for GWAS, but we expect that the general strategy suggested here might be adaptable for
other statistical methods, e.g., for sparse partitioning [21].
Since the introduction of differential privacy by [9], and in particular -differential privacy,
many additional variations along with their considerations with respect to statistical analysis
have been proposed (e.g., more recently [11]). To further improve the privacy-utility tradeoffs
for GWAS, the future research would consider such alternate mechanisms.
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